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Gábor Schweitzer: 
 
Responses in Hungarian constitutional theory to the so-called anti-Jewish laws  
(1938-1943) 
 
I. More than half a million Hungarian Jews fell victim to the Holocaust during World War II. 
The physical extermination of Jews was preceded by their economic and social 
marginalization and their ostracism from intellectual and public life. The overture of the 
process was Act no. XXV of 1920 and its executive decree, which introduced the numerus 
clausus – ’closed number’ – regulation, limiting the proportion of Jews admitted to 
universities and colleges of higher education to the proportion of Jews within the general 
population.
1
 The legislator justified the constraints, which constituted severe infringements of 
the principle of legal equality and the freedom of education, by claiming that at certain 
faculties, such as medical school, law school and the faculty of political science, the 
proportion of Jewish students was too high. The limitations were aimed at reducing the 
proportion of Jews in certain professions. Although during the period of political 
consolidation, from the end of the 1920’s, the numerus clausus rules were less stringently 
applied at universities and colleges, from the second half of the 1930’s, political antisemitism 
gathered new impetus in Hungary, and as a result, government measures were introduced to 
exclude the country’s Jewish population from much wider areas than just higher education. In 
what follows, I shall review the reflections of the scholars of constitutional theory to these 
measures curtailing and corroding fundamental constitutional rights, in particular the legal 
equality of citizens, particularly the so-called first and second anti-Jewish laws, adopted in 
1938 and 1939. 
 
II. The Hungarian legislature began to adopt the so-called anti-Jewish laws, which demolished 
the equality of citizens before the law and incorporated racist, discriminative rules, from 
1938.
2
 The first antisemitic law of the period was Act no. XV of 1938, on the more effective 
assurance of balance in social and economic life.
3
 Its adoption did not come as a surprise to 
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Hungarian society; the speech given by Prime Minister Kálmán Darányi on 18 April 1937, at 
the general assembly of the governing National Unity Party had already foreshadowed the 
necessity of resolving the so-called Jewish question and the governmental level. The prime 
minister considered the Jewish question to be primarily an economic problem: he claimed that 
while Hungary had a large proportion of Jews in the general population, they were 
significantly overrepresented even relative to that ratio in business. Hungarian society – as he 
put it – was “irritated” by the alleged “instinctive commercial greed” of the “Galician” 
infiltrating it from the East, and the government was going to apply strict measures in order to 
put a stop to that infiltration.
4
 As the report of the German embassy emphasized at the time, 
the plans announced by Kálmán Darányi, such as the tax reform, the increase in corporate tax, 
the involvement of business and finance in eliminating white-collar unemployment were 
primarily going to be harmful to affluent Jews, and as such, in their effect, they could be 
considered measures “of an antisemitic character”.5 
 
III. Kálmán Molnár (1881-1961), a professor at the faculty of Hungarian constitutional law 
at the University of Pécs was the first scholar of constitutional theory to note the dangers 
inherent in Kálmán Darányi’s speech. This was no accident: he had been fighting against 
extremist and antisemitic incidents that occurred at the Pécs university for several years. He 
intended to respond to the prime minister’s speech in a newspaper article. He summarized his 
thoughts in a piece entitled “Hatred Is Not a Constructive Power”, dated 1 May 1937, but, as 
he later wrote on the first page of the manuscript, the papers all refused to publish it.
6
 What 
was the article about? According to Professor Molnár, there were some aspects of the Jewish 
question on which there was agreement on the “Christian side”. As regards the economic 
causes of the Jewish question, he agreed with the prime minister, but he expressed the 
conviction that such a grave economic and social issue could only be approached with 
composure, circumspection and responsibility, rather than hate and the desire to do harm. He 
felt it was beyond doubt that Hungary, standing guard at the Eastern gate of European, 
Christian civilization, could only resolve the Jewish question “in an European, Christian 
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spirit”. The great problems of public life cannot be resolved with finality using the methods of 
“Eastern barbarism”. “In our land, the louder the proclaimers of grandiloquent slogans, the 
less dangerous they are.” In order to find the correct solution, “the principles must be cleared 
up first”. In relation to that, he wrote that he considered the inclusion of converted Jews in the 
category of Jews to be an “unchristian, unlawful and unreasonable” demand. Unchristian, 
because it is contrary to the commandments of Christianity. Unlawful, because the 
constitutional law of Hungary only recognized the Jewish religion, but “there is no Jewish 
race”. And the endeavor was also contrary to the spirit of the Hungarian constitution, as 
accepting racial theory would “explode the very pillars of the state organization of the Holy 
Crown”. That was because the Holy Crown, as the embodiment of Hungary’s statehood and 
national unity “connected and united everyone”, the nobility, the serfs, “settlers of foreign 
races”, and even the Jews, who were under royal protection. He believed that including 
converts among the Jews to be contrary to reason as well because there were not enough 
Hungarians to be able to afford excluding those whose ancestors “were sons of a foreign 
race”. The notion was also unacceptable to Kálmán Molnár because he considered 
assimilation to be the “most reassuring” solution to the Jewish question. “The original Jewry 
is practically assimilated already. That process should not be disturbed but assisted.” He also 
considered the views urging the banishment of the great majority of Hungarian citizens of the 
Jewish religion – according to Kálmán Molnár’s data, some 450,000 people7 – to be 
irresponsible incitement, rabble-rousing demagoguery. Even the German Reich, which was 
certainly not using “kid gloves”, had been unable to do that. The more extreme and 
unreasonable the antisemitic incitement, the more people with moderate and “gentlemanlike” 
ways of thinking would be repelled by this “manhunt”, which is foreign to the Hungarian 
spirit. According to his summary statement, the mad excesses of antisemitism would result in 
increasing numbers of people becoming sympathetic to the Jews as the “pitiable victims of 
spiritual brutality”.8 Kálmán Molnár’s article, written from a Christian humanist perspective, 
was clearly opposed to the racist attitudes poisoning public opinion as well. Consistently with 
the Hungarian tradition of constitutional law, he claimed that in Hungary, Jews belonged in a 
religious rather than a racial category. Contrary to the demands aimed at the institutional 
expulsion of Jews, he supported assimilation as a means of facilitating social integration. 
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On 5 May 1938, when the parliamentary debate on Bill no. XV of 1938 began, a group of 
emphatically Christian authors, artists and scientists published a protest in the daily paper 
“Pesti Napló” (Pest Journal). “We are impelled by our Christian faith, our patriotic 
convictions and our insistence on the country’s European convictions and our national 
independence to abide by the principle of the equality of citizens before the law, achieved by 
the best minds of European Hungarians during the most beautiful period of our history.” – 
they emphasized.
9
 They claimed that the bill degrades “the Christian middle class”, as it 
assumes that through contempt for the principle of equality before the law, they hope to 
assure their livelihood by “the stripping of rights, a humiliating paternalism and the use of 
coercion”. The bill also ascribed to the Christian middle class “the moral aberration” of 
attempting to succeed and prosper at the cost of stigmatizing their fellow citizens and robbing 
them of their civil rights. Two of the Hungarian scholars of constitutional theory signed the 
protest: Kálmán Molnár, and Ödön Polner (1865-1961), a retired professor of constitutional 
law at Szeged University. Their arguments, which appealed to Christianity, European ideals 
and patriotism, failed to dissuade the legislator of its original purpose. 
 
The provisions of Act no. XV of 1938, promulgated on 29 May 1938, reduced the permitted 
ratio of Jews in the so-called freelance professions (e.g. solicitors, public notaries, engineers, 
journalists, actors) to 20%, as well as at financial, commercial and industrial ventures 
employing more than ten people. According to the Act, not only members of the 
denomination of Judaism, but also people who had converted after 31 July 1919 were to be 
considered Jews. The so-called first anti-Jewish law jeopardized the jobs of some 15 thousand 
people and, including family members, it had an impact on some 50 thousand people.
10
 
 
Barely six months after the introduction of Act no. XV of 1938, and after Kálmán Darányi 
was replaced by Béla Imrédy in the prime minister’s chair, the government began to prepare 
the so-called second anti-Jewish act, eventually adopted as Act no. IV of 1939, which 
prescribed more severe limitations of constitutional and civil rights, and which was based 
much more firmly on racial principles, and thereby affected a wider range of people.
11
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At the turn of 1938/39, Kálmán Molnár opposed the proposed curbing and elimination of 
rights in public, in the daily paper “Magyar Nemzet” (Hungarian Nation). “... every single 
Hungarian who is already able to think (...) has a tremendous responsibility for that which is 
happening in these fateful days for Hungarians. Today, when we hear so frequently the 
thunderous words and curses of intimidation and menace, when so many write and scream: 
Jews, beware, and the Christian stooges and the lapdogs of Jews, beware even more, I feel I 
must make my application. (...) So my request to those keeping the list of the proscribed is as 
follows: should my name not be on that list already, please add me to it now. I have never 
been, and I am still not a hunter of men.” – he wrote, and continued: “It were not the Jews 
that made me a defender of the Jews, but the un-Hungarian Hungarians and the Christians 
who have turned away from Christ”.12 A few weeks later he published another article in 
Magyar Nemzet. He explained that in his view, the disturbed balance of social and economic 
life certainly did have to be redressed, “the unjustified predomination of Jews has to be 
eliminated, the just proportions need to be restored”, but all of that should not be achieved at 
the cost of “a severe disturbance of social peace, restfulness and cooperation”. He believed 
that it was wrong to establish a constitutional ghetto for the Jews. Instead of a constitutional 
ghetto, the ghetto “should be swept clean”, irrespective of religious denomination. The full 
force of the law should be applied to criminals, Jewish and non-Jewish alike. On the other 
hand, “the patriotic, industrious and unimpeachable Jews who have shared our fate for 
centuries may expect justice, understanding and fairness from us”. The yellow patch, 
Professor Molnár reminded his readers, places a mark of shame on the foreheads of “those 
who wish to attach it to the clothing of their fellow men”. His sober, placatory words fell on 
deaf ears once again.
13
  
 
Among Kálmán Molnár’s documentary estate, there remains a draft letter he addressed to 
Károly Rassay, the leading figure of the parliamentary opposition that opposed the anti-
Jewish laws bravely and consistently, during the parliamentary debate of the second anti-
Jewish law. According to Professor Molnár, Rassay’s speeches to the house of representatives 
would prove for posterity that “even during that sorrowful age, there were still jurists who 
saw statutory law not only as the instruments and forms of power, but as the human 
expression and practical implementation of our divinely inspired sense of justice”. Rassay’s 
contributions would also prove that “even in that age, there were legislators who were able to 
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think logically; who endeavored to produce statutes that were clear and free of internal 
contradictions, and which precluded tyranny and suitable for bona fide application by 
humane enforcers; and not suitable for use for the spiritual and bodily torture of decent 
people. They will prove that even during that age, there were some spiritually Christian 
people.”14  
 
Around the same time, Professor Ödön Polner expressed his opinion about the new anti-
Jewish act under preparation in an interview published in the 6 January 1939 edition of the 
“Esti Kurír” (Evening Courier) newspaper. His view of the bill was that it was sharply 
opposed to the direction of Hungarian legislation from the 1848 bourgeois revolution to the 
period of World War I. His comment was referring to the liberal legal policies of that period. 
In that regard, the bill took a retrograde step. At the same time, the legislator introduced “a 
new legal category of classes”, that of race, which – we could add – had been previously 
unknown in the Hungarian tradition of constitutional law. And the regression was also 
perceptible in humanitarian, cultural and economic areas. In its intentions, the anti-Jewish bill 
considered itself right-wing, patriotic and Christian. If the direction towards eliminating 
freedom and introducing constraints and limitations was the right-wing one, then, indeed, the 
anti-Jewish bill was right-wing. And if patriotism is the support of that which is in the interest 
of the nation – which is “useful, expedient or necessary” for it – then opinions may differ on 
that count. But Ödön Polner was convinced that the bill was not in “Christ’s spirit”, as the 
Savior – contrary to those that composed the bill – was of the opinion that “all people are our 
brethren, irrespective of nation or race”.15 
 
Those sober words were once more in vain. Act no. IV of 1939, promulgated on 5 May 1939, 
reduced the proportion of Jews employed by industrial and commercial firms from the earlier 
20% to 12%, while the permitted proportion of Jews or rather persons classified as Jews 
among free-lance intellectuals was reduced to 6%, essentially their proportion in the total 
population. The proportion of Jews admitted to universities and colleges of higher education 
was limited to 6% with the exception of the technical university, to which a limit of 12% was 
applied. The right to sell goods under state monopoly was denied to Jews altogether. The 
political rights of Jews were severely restricted, resulting in almost a hundred thousand people 
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losing their national and local municipal franchise. Jews on local municipal boards who 
received their places on account of being the largest taxpayers were stripped of their 
membership. With the exception of the representative of the Israelite denomination, retained 
until 1940, no Jew could be a member of the Upper House, either. Jews were completely 
barred from the civil service. As a result of the regulations, 60 thousand people became 
unemployed, impacting 150 thousand people including their family members.
16
 
 
Kálmán Molnár and Ödön Polner explicitly rejected the so-called first and second anti-Jewish 
laws, which incorporated discriminative regulations into Hungarian law. They believed it was 
unacceptable that these provisions contradicted the principle of equality before the law, and 
they also objected to the fact that due to their racist character, the anti-Jewish laws were in 
contradiction not only with the Hungarian tradition of constitutional law but also with the 
Christian ethos. After the adoption of Act no. XV of 1938, Kálmán Molnár clearly stated in 
one of his books – though in 1938, the government were still trying to deny this – that the 
provisions of the anti-Jewish law had eliminated the equality of citizens in respect of Jews and 
persons considered to be Jews
17
. Any imbalances in social and economic life could not be 
remedied by the false promise of proportionality accompanied by the destruction of the legal 
equality of citizens. 
 
Paradoxically, at the time of the adoption of the first anti-Jewish law, the government even 
attempted the constitutional absurdity of reconciling the principle of legal equality and the 
curtailment of rights. During a joint session of parliamentary committees (for constitutional 
law, economy and transport, public education and justice) where the bill was debated, Prime 
Minister Kálmán Darányi attempted to establish such a reconciliation. In his address, he 
claimed that “the great principles” – such the equality before the law – should be protected, 
“but not in a formalistic fashion, but, rather, in their essence”. Accordingly, as far as possible, 
equal preconditions should be provided to make a living through the reduction of the 
economic inequality, which, according to the prime minister, had been brought about and 
maintained at certain ventures by the Jews. In his view, the bill did not infringe the provisions 
of Act no. XVII of 1867 on the civil and political emancipation of Jews, but he also 
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emphasized that any law could be changed in time.
18
 During the parliamentary committee 
debate of the bill, Minister of Justice Ödön Mikecz also touched on the issue of legal equality. 
The Hungarian legislature, as he put it, had never considered legal equality to be a supreme 
principle that had to be maintained above all, “to the detriment of the nation’s life”. When it 
has become necessary in order to prevent the loss of balance between certain social or 
economic strata of the nation or the alleviate conflict between them, the legislature had 
constrained the principle of legal equality in the interest of the state.
19
 The difference in the 
attitudes of Prime Minister Darányi and Minister of Justice Mikecz is quite clear. While 
Darányi denied the claim that the bill curtailed legal equality, Mikecz found the curtailment of 
legal equality acceptable for the public good. The interpretation of legal equality was also 
raised during the debates of the bill in the House of Representatives and the Upper House. 
While the liberal and democratic opposition was unanimous in the view that the bill was in 
infringement of the principle of equality before the law, the supporters of the bill either 
attempted to refute the claim that equality was being infringed, or claimed that the curtailment 
of equality was justified in order to achieve the economic and social objectives they insisted 
on.
20
 
 
Others among the scholars of constitutional law also voiced their reservations about the 
direction of the anti-Jewish laws, albeit in a more cautious fashion than Kálmán Molnár and 
Ödön Polner. In a study reviewing the changes of Hungarian constitutional aw in the period 
1918 to 1939, Béla Zsedényi (1894-1955), professor at the Miskolc Evangelical Academy of 
Law, mentioned the first and second anti-Jewish laws, among others, when discussing the 
changes involving the rights and obligations of citizens. “Among those laws”, he wrote, “a few 
represent quite significant opposition to the old tenets and even the principles of the 
constitution”, as they bear the mark of the ideals and the new world-view of the new age with 
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great certitude.
21
 József Bölöny (1903-1990), a Budapest solicitor and a lecturer at the 
University of Pécs, in his summary of constitutional law published in 1942, merely noted that 
the effective anti-Jewish laws “constrained the equality of citizens before the law.”22 
 
IV. Constitutional theory justifications of the anti-Jewish laws can be found in the 
contemporaneous writings of Vilmos Szontagh (1885-1962), professor at the Miskolc 
Evangelical Academy of Law, and Albert Kaas (1885-1961), professor of constitutional law 
at the Budapest University of Economics. 
 
Vilmos Szontagh first addressed issues associated with the constitutionality of Act no. IV of 
1939 in a newspaper article, which he then followed up in a comprehensive study. In his view, 
the question of unconstitutionality may be raised in relation to any law if the provisions of 
that law are not consistent with the interpretation of the constitution in effect at the time of its 
adoption. Under that approach – in his view – Act no. IV of 1939 could not be considered 
unconstitutional, as its provisions were consistent with the current interpretation of the 
constitution at the time. At the time of adoption of Act no. XVII of 1867 on the emancipation 
of Jews, the “liberal constitutional approach” had dominated, but when Act no. IV of 1939 
was passed, the “nationalistic constitutional approach” governed. And the nationalistic 
constitutional approach, he claimed, will not tolerate the selfish success of classes, orders, 
“races” to the detriment of “the ideal of nationalism” and “national statehood”.23 Therefore, it 
was not Act no. IV of 1939 that was unconstitutional, but rather the “liberal state of law” 
whose elimination was the actual purpose of Act no. IV of 1939 itself. In his work entitled 
“The anti-Jewish law from the perspective of the theory of law”, published in 1939, he 
expounded the same, hardly justifiable views more precisely: he drew a distinction between 
formal unconstitutionality, and material unconstitutionality, which is relevant to the present 
review. In his view, a law is to be considered unconstitutional in the material sense if the 
provisions of the formally faultless statute contradict “some previous written or unwritten 
constitutional tenet of law”. But as “the spirit of the constitution” varies from age to age, there 
can be no objection on the grounds of unconstitutionality against Act no. IV of 1939. Even he 
acknowledged, however, that as a result of the provisions eliminating legal equality, the 
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Jewish population had been put in a less favorable situation, and hence the injury to their 
interests is “beyond doubt”.24 
 
In his paper published in 1938, Albert Kaas reviewed the Jewish question not with respect to 
changes in constitutional approach, but through aspects of economic and social life. “In 
Hungary, the Jewish question was made vital and permanently relevant by the fact that they 
achieved a disproportionate domination within the economy, that they became aware of their 
indispensability at the end of the last century, and then wished to assert it in every field.” His 
reasoning, based on generalizations, crossed into the field of constitutional theory when he 
derived the possibility of constraining legal equality from the necessity of the struggle for 
existence. “The decisive thing is not human rights, nor is it the principle of equality before the 
law; it is the struggle for existence.” In his view, legal equality and human rights have only 
been respected by states to the point where does principles of justice didn’t threaten the 
universal interests of the community. “And if the true salus rei publicae demanded it, they 
constrained them”. The Jewish question – in his view – could be resolved if the Jews gave up 
the advantage they had enjoyed for decades and renounce their “selfishness”.25  
 
V. In addition, several of the scholars of constitutional theory interpreted the discriminative 
regulations essentially consistently with the legislature’s intentions. The group includes 
Móricz Tomcsányi (1878-1951), professor at the University of Budapest, whose textbook on 
Hungarian constitutional law published in 1940 discussed the theoretical aspects of the anti-
Jewish laws in relation to personal liberties. In agreement with the official approach, he 
considered the purpose of the anti-Jewish laws to be the harmonization of the economic and 
social position of Jews – which had jeopardized the development of “the Hungarian race and 
the Hungarian nation” – with their proportion within the national population. In his opinion, 
the principle of equality before the law could be made consistent with the criterion of the 
proportionality of rights and obligations. From the perspective of legal policy, he believed all 
restrictions to be acceptable provided they were truly necessitated by the “vital interest of the 
nation”26  
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István Egyed (1886-1966), professor of constitutional law at the Budapest University of 
Technology, expressed a similar position in his summary entitled “Our constitution”, 
published in 1943. He claimed that the constraints introduced in the economy, in social and 
public life were aimed at “maintaining the Christian character of the state”, “protecting the 
purity of the race” and “ensuring a leading role for the majority”. As regards equality before 
the law, he emphasized that the principle does not preclude “certain groups of the national 
society being constrained to proportional success”.27 It is important to note that at the time of 
writing of his book, Act no. XV of 1941, the so-called third anti-Jewish law, which prohibited 
marriage between Jews and Christians for “racial protection” purposes, was already in effect. 
Act no. VII of 1942, which encroached upon the legal status of the Israelite denomination by 
reclassifying it from a so-called accepted denomination to a so-called recognized one, and 
which, among other things, prohibited conversion to Judaism by law, had also come into 
effect by that time. 
 
László Buza (1885-1969), who gave the main series of lectures on Hungarian constitutional 
law at the University of Szeged in the 1939/40 academic year, was of the opinion that while 
Act no. IV of 1939 may have contradicted the formal requirement of equality before the law, 
state intervention had nevertheless been necessary. The reason was that the suspension of 
legal equality was required in order to avert some obstacles to actual equality. As an example, 
Professor Buza noted that in the economy, social conflicts between citizens, particularly large 
inequalities of wealth, could be eliminated in that fashion.
28
  
 
The views of István Csekey (1889-1963), professor at Szeged and then at Kolozsvár 
University, were little different to those of László Buza. In his book published in 1943, 
entitled “The constitution of Hungary” he claimed that the curtailment and suspension of the 
principle of legal equality (equality before the law) had been justified in order to stop Jews 
being successful in economic and social life beyond their proportion within the population. As 
he put it: “By suspending the formal requirement of legal equality the state aimed to remove 
some striking obstacles to actual equality”. Although he admitted that the restrictive measures 
against Jews were contrary to legal equality, he claimed that legal equality itself could only be 
a means to achieving actual equality.
29
 However, in relation to Professor Csekey’s views it 
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must also be noted that on several occasions, for instance in his speech entitled “Race and 
nation” at the 1939 closing conference of Szeged University, he clearly opposed Nazi racial 
theory.
30
 
 
The representatives of Hungarian constitutional theory did not form a united position on the 
so-called anti-Jewish laws adopted after 1938. In addition to their honorably consistent 
opponents, the discriminative statutes also had their committed legitimators and, allied to the 
latter group, their loyal interpreters as well. The scholars or constitutional theory were 
obviously aware of the fact that the anti-Jewish laws had impacted the fundamental issues of 
Hungarian constitutional law. It is a conspicuous fact that they failed to agree even on the 
interpretation of legal equality, or equality before the law, a cardinal concept for constitutional 
theory.
31
 Yet legal equality can hardly be said to exist if the proportions of positions in 
economic, social and intellectual life are limited to the proportions of a denomination within 
the total population of the country and if jobs are granted or withheld on that basis. The theory 
of “predomination” and the construction of “ratios” were only the government’s tools for 
providing some sort of legitimization for the constrainment and elimination of equality before 
the law, or, in other words, the institutionalization of discrimination. In closing, I would like 
to quote a sentence from Kálmán Molnár’s 1945 study, “The constitutional law balance of 
the provisional period between the two world wars”. In Professor Molnár’s opinion, the 
anti-Jewish laws didn’t simply have the fateful consequence of eliminating equality before the 
law, previously considered the soundest cornerstone of constitutional law – they also 
destroyed the rule of law as a whole.
32
 Despite the fact, we may add, that the most eminent 
and courageous Hungarian scholars of constitutional theory had warned of their inherent 
dangers in good time. 
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